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STEP ZERO AFTER CITY OF ARLINGTON
Thomas W. Merrill*
INTRODUCTION
The thirty-year history of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.1 is a story of triumph in the courts and frustration on
the part of administrative law scholars.2 Chevron‘s appeal for the courts
rests in significant part on its ease of application as a decisional device.
Questions about the validity of an agency‘s interpretation of a statute are
reduced to two inquiries: whether the statute itself provides a clear answer
and, if not, whether the agency‘s answer is a reasonable one. The
framework can be applied to virtually any statutory interpretation question
resolved by an agency, and its component elements—―clarity‖ and
―reasonableness‖—are sufficiently flexible to permit virtually any outcome
in any particular case. Chevron also serves as the U.S. Supreme Court‘s
most important admonition to lower courts not to substitute their judgment
for agencies‘ on matters of policy, at least those matters that have not been
resolved by Congress itself. Thus, Chevron can be invoked, when the
circumstances warrant, as a symbol of judicial restraint.
The frustration of many administrative law scholars rests on Chevron‘s
awkwardness in discharging important functions of judicial review of
agency action. Judicial review performs a variety of functions, including
protecting individuals from arbitrary bureaucratic action and promoting
accountability by requiring agencies to explain the reasons for their
decisions. I will focus here on another important function of judicial
review, which I will call boundary maintenance. Boundary maintenance
includes, importantly, the principle of legislative supremacy—that agencies
must respect the will of Congress. Congress is the institution best situated
to allocate governmental authority among different institutions in a federal
system, and when Congress has settled on a division of powers, it is critical

* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. I filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the petitioners in City of Arlington v. FCC on behalf of the National Governors
Association and other state and local government associations. See Amicus Curiae Brief of
the Nat‘l Governors Ass‘n, et al. in Support of Petitioners, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S.
Ct. 1863 (2013) (Nos. 11-1545, 11-1547), 2012 WL 5982593.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. This Article is part of a larger symposium entitled Chevron at 30: Looking Back and
Looking Forward. For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J.
Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 475 (2014).
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that courts respect and enforce it.3 But boundary maintenance also draws
upon other important precepts, such as the requirements that agencies honor
individuals‘ rights, abstain from interfering with authority given to other
agencies, abide by relevant obligations contained in international law, and
respect the traditional prerogatives of state and local governments.
Although Congress is the appropriate institution to establish the
boundaries of agency authority ex ante, courts are well suited to resolve
disputes over the scope of agency authority that arise ex post.4 One reason
is that judges are relatively less biased about matters of government
authority than other governmental institutions are likely to be.5 Federal
judges, in particular, enjoy life tenure and secure compensation, and so are
comparatively more insulated from the political passions of the day. This is
not to say that judges are free from ideological predilections or intellectual
fashions. But they are relatively more impartial than other, more politically
responsive governmental institutions. They are not perfect umpires but are
better than any of the alternatives. A second reason is that judges are
poorly situated to seize significant political authority for themselves. They
are largely limited to deciding cases brought by others, and, at the higher
levels of the judicial hierarchy, can decide only a small fraction of contested
cases in any given year. Moreover, because each judge exercises individual
judgment in deciding the cases courts do hear, it is very difficult for courts
to achieve the coordination that would be necessary to take control of policy
on a sustained basis in any given area.6 In Alexander Hamilton‘s famous
expression, the judiciary is the ―least dangerous‖ branch,7 and hence the
safest to task with resolving disputes over the boundaries of the power
exercised by others.
Chevron is poorly designed to allow courts to perform this boundary
maintenance function. The key problem is that the principles that inform
the location of the various boundaries of agency authority are not ordinarily
found in ―clear‖ legislative texts. Sometimes they are, in which case courts
can enforce these limitations at Step One of the Chevron framework. But
more often, the relevant boundaries are found in constitutional doctrines,
judicial precedents, and established practices that have evolved over time
regarding the conduct of governmental affairs—custom or tradition or the
―small c‖ constitution if you will.8 Step One of Chevron, which asks
whether Congress has spoken clearly to the precise issue in controversy,
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 452, 474–75 (2010).
4. The following discussion can be regarded as a form of generalized institutional
realism about courts, especially federal courts. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Institutional
Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
5. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 124–28 (1994).
6. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 123–32 (2006).
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001).
8. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (developing the idea that certain
important statutes and their evolved interpretation represent a ―small c‖ constitution).
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provides no obvious way of enforcing these understandings.9 Conceivably,
they could come into play at Step Two, which asks whether the agency‘s
interpretation is reasonable.10 But the dominant understanding of Step Two
has been that the courts ask whether the agency has adopted a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory text, not whether it has acted reasonably in
light of broader traditions about the division of authority among
governmental institutions and between government and individual.11
There are, in principle, three ways to reconcile the traditional judicial
function of boundary maintenance with Chevron‘s reductionist two-step
framework. One would be to overrule Chevron, or at least to cabin it as a
special doctrine that applies only when Congress has expressly delegated
authority to an agency to engage in the interpretation of a particular
statutory term. This would have been feasible in the early years after
Chevron was decided. There is no evidence that the Justices who joined the
opinion regarded it as a significant revision of administrative law,12 and
even its author, Justice Stevens, tried in later decisions to limit Chevron to
questions of statutory application.13 But Chevron has now been invoked in
far too many decisions to make overruling it a feasible option for the Court.
And cabining Chevron to cases of express delegation of authority to
interpret particular statutory provisions also has been explicitly or implicitly
rejected by the Court,14 and this too would seem to be too unsettling to be
feasible.
Another accommodation would be to transform Chevron‘s Step One, or
conceivably Step Two, into a wide-ranging inquiry that includes boundary
maintenance as well as ordinary statutory interpretation. This is a path the
Court has occasionally taken. For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,15 the Court concluded after an examination of the lengthy
history of interaction between Congress and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) that Congress had ―clearly‖ denied the FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco products. The decision was ostensibly rendered
under Chevron‘s Step One but was indistinguishable from an exercise in de
novo review—looking to a vast array of contextual evidence to resolve an
important question of boundary maintenance. More recently, in Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA,16 the Court concluded that the Environmental
9. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
10. Id.
11. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
853 (2001).
12. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark,
66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 275–77 (2014).
13. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 529–30 (2013) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
14. For explicit rejection, see Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 (2011) (declining, in the tax context, to follow
precedent limiting Chevron-style deference to agency interpretations authorized by express
delegations of interpretative authority).
15. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
16. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014).
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Protection Agency (EPA) had acted unreasonably in interpreting ―any air
pollutant‖ to include greenhouse gases for purposes of certain stationary
source provisions of the Clean Air Act. Although the decision was
ostensibly based on Chevron‘s Step Two, the Court concluded that the
agency‘s interpretation was unreasonable in part because it ―would bring
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA‘s regulatory
authority without clear congressional authorization.‖17 In other words, the
Court was engaging in boundary maintenance through an aggressive
application of Step Two. The problem with blowing up Step One or Step
Two in this fashion is that it transforms Chevron from a deference doctrine
into a form of de novo review, yet it does so episodically and without any
announced basis for the circumstances that trigger such a transformation in
the doctrine.
The third accommodation would be to develop a set of threshold
conditions that would have to be satisfied before the Chevron doctrine, in
its original two-step formulation, would apply. The Court took a major step
in this direction in United States v. Mead Corp.,18 in which it set forth (in a
rather muddled fashion) the threshold conditions that must be satisfied
before a court can conclude that Congress has delegated the type of
authority to an agency that will trigger Chevron review. This has come to
be known as Chevron ―Step Zero.‖19 Recently, in City of Arlington v.
FCC,20 the petitioners asked the Court to adopt an additional threshold
condition—a determination that the interpretational question at issue falls
within the scope of the agency‘s jurisdiction—before Chevron applies.
Their proposal, in effect, was to expand Step Zero to allow courts to resolve
this important question of boundary maintenance before turning to
Chevron.21 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, writing for the Court‘s two
most conservative and three most liberal members, the Court rejected the
invitation to cabin Chevron in this fashion.22 The unifying impulse behind
this odd coalition seemed to be the perception that a ―jurisdictional‖
17. Id. at 2444. In sharp contrast, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court concluded that the
plain meaning of ―air pollutant‖ included greenhouse gases, this decision being an exercise
of Chevron Step One. 549 U.S. 497, 527–29 (2007). Both decisions reveal shifting
majorities of the Court manipulating Chevron Step One and Step Two to overturn agency
policy judgments.
18. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
19. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 873. In this symposium, a number of
other contributors also focus extensively on Mead and Chevron Step Zero. See Jack M.
Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 731, 741–43 (2014); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 527, 528–30 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
789, 792–93 (2014). Another contribution relies on a dataset of 730 pre- and post-Chevron
Supreme Court decisions to evaluate the use of Chevron and Skidmore in the workplace-law
context. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (2014). And a final contribution argues that federalism concerns
should play no role at Chevron Step Zero. Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 646–52 (2014).
20. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
21. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
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exception to Chevron would be too uncertain to permit principled
application.23
The dissenters in City of Arlington, led by Chief Justice Roberts,
protested that giving Chevron deference to agencies‘ views about the scope
of their own authority was completely at odds with what I have called the
boundary maintenance function of the courts. As he put it, ―[a]n agency
cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an
agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference
to the agency.‖24 He also suggested, intriguingly, that courts could
effectively monitor attempts by agencies to transgress the boundaries of
their delegated authority by applying the Mead factors in an appropriately
particularized fashion.25 The suggestion was that courts should carefully
calibrate the scope of the delegation to agencies to act with the force of law,
taking into account both affirmative grants of delegated power and negative
limitations on those grants.26
This Article considers whether the traditional boundary maintenance
function of judicial review can be reconciled with Chevron through
appropriate implementation of Step Zero. I begin by reviewing the
rationale for Step Zero, its rather confusing adoption in Mead, and the
failed attempt to expand Step Zero in City of Arlington. I then argue that
City of Arlington has solidified the Court‘s commitment to Step Zero, at
least as articulated in Mead. Next, I turn to Chief Justice Roberts‘s
suggestion that a more carefully calibrated application of the Mead factors
could serve as a substitute for an explicit ―agency jurisdiction‖ inquiry as
part of Step Zero. I conclude that the Chief Justice‘s suggestion represents
the best available solution to reconciling Chevron with the courts‘
traditional boundary maintenance function. The Chief Justice‘s approach
would situate the boundary maintenance function as part of Step Zero,
where the court engages in de novo review. This would suggest that the
reviewing court is free to ignore the views of the agency—which is
unfortunate. Nevertheless, it would allow courts to draw upon traditions
other than Chevron, such as the doctrines that inform questions of
separation of powers, individual constitutional rights, and preemption of
state law, in deciding whether the agency has transgressed the limits of its
authority. It would also allow courts to consider a variety of contextual
sources, such as the history of an agency‘s exercise of regulatory authority
in a particular area, in asking whether Congress intended the agency to act
with the force of law with respect to the issue in question. The Chief
Justice‘s proposal can be regarded as a second-best solution to preserving
the boundary maintenance function of courts in a world in which the
Supreme Court is committed to preserving Chevron. His solution would
provide better guidance to lower courts and agencies than having the
Supreme Court engage in episodic and unpredictable manipulation of
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1884.
Id. at 1880–84.
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Chevron‘s Step One and Step Two. It might also do more to promote the
use of Chevron as a genuine mandate for deference to agency views.
I. WHY STEP ZERO?
Chevron did not itself use the terms ―Step One‖ and ―Step Two‖ in
describing how courts should evaluate agency interpretations of statutes.
But lower courts quickly dubbed it the ―two-step framework,‖27 and this
locution is now familiar. Although the formulation of the steps varies, Step
One is generally thought to require courts to determine whether the statute
has a ―clear‖ meaning with respect to the issue in controversy.28 If the
answer is yes, then the court adopts this meaning (which of course might be
the agency‘s interpretation). If the court concludes that the statute is not
clear, then it moves on to Step Two, where the relevant inquiry is whether
the agency‘s interpretation is ―reasonable‖ or ―permissible.‖ If the answer
to this question is affirmative, then the court upholds the agency
interpretation; if not, the court either remands to the agency or adopts its
own interpretation of the statute.
Chevron said relatively little about the threshold conditions that would
trigger the application of this two-step approach, other than to note in
passing that the EPA, whose interpretation was at issue, had been ―entrusted
to administer‖ the Clean Air Act.29 Later decisions also spoke vaguely
about interpretations of statutes that an agency had been ―charged‖ with
administering.30 As time passed, it became increasingly clear that a more
precise understanding of what was required to trigger the Chevron two-step
approach was needed. Because Chevron had already commandeered Steps
One and Two, Kristin Hickman and I, in an article published in 2001,
dubbed this threshold inquiry Chevron ―Step Zero,‖ and this locution has
caught on.31 Three considerations, in particular, made it imperative to
develop a more precise conception of when Chevron should be applied.
One reason some limiting principle was necessary is that Chevron
included language about the rationale for deference that was vastly
overbroad. In a key passage, Justice Stevens noted that sometimes
Congress explicitly delegates authority to agencies to define specific
statutory provisions. When it does so, he observed, the agencies‘
interpretations are ―given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.‖32 Without missing a beat,
Justice Stevens immediately added: ―Sometimes the legislative delegation
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such
27. See, e.g., Int‘l Bd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 1423, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
28. Sometimes Step One is framed in terms of the opposite of ―clear,‖ where it is
generally said the statute is ―ambiguous‖ or contains a ―gap.‖ E.g., Nat‘l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
29. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
30. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996).
31. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 836–37. The phrase was given an important
boost by Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–11 (2006).
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.‖33 This passage suggested that any time Congress has left a gap or
ambiguity in a statute administered by an agency this should be viewed as
an ―implied delegation‖ of interpretative authority to the agency, and that
this entitles the agency to deference.
Taken literally, the idea that any gap or ambiguity is an implied
delegation to an agency would represent a massive expansion of
administrative authority. The standard assumption, derived from the
nondelegation doctrine, is that agencies have no authority to act unless
power is delegated to them.34 Every statute contains gaps and ambiguities.
If gaps and ambiguities are implied delegations, then once Congress
delegates any authority to an agency, it could limit the delegation only by
enacting clear statutory language restricting that authority. In other words,
rather than putting the burden on an agency to show authority to act, the
burden would be on Congress to constrain the agency‘s authority to act by
unambiguous language.35 There is no support in our constitutional
traditions for such an inversion of the standard assumption about
delegation. Even Chevron‘s most enthusiastic champions admit that the
idea of an ―implied delegation‖ is a fiction.36 As to whether Congress has
embraced such an understanding, such evidence as exists suggests the
opposite.37
The novelty and implausibility of the implied delegation fiction
suggested the need for a more persuasive basis for concluding that Congress
has delegated interpretational authority to the agency.38 The identification
of this triggering set of circumstances would obviously have to be
undertaken before applying the Chevron two-step. In other words, the
identification would have to be made at Step Zero.
A second reason why some threshold inquiry was needed was that it
became increasingly clear—as it should have been from the beginning—
that Chevron cannot serve as the exclusive standard for reviewing questions
of statutory interpretation decided by agencies. For example, the Court has
never suggested that trans-substantive statutes like the Administrative
Procedure Act39 (APA) or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act40
(RFRA) should be interpreted by giving deference to agency
interpretations.41 Such statutes are designed to constrain agency action—
33. Id.
34. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2109–14 (2004).
35. See id.
36. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17.
37. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 470–76 (1989).
38. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 874–88.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb–1 to 2000bb–4 (2012).
41. See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (holding that
Chevron does not apply to agency interpretations of the APA). The Court recently
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they have always been and will continue to be interpreted by courts through
exercises in independent judgment about the meaning of contested
provisions. Nor has the Court ever suggested that it would defer to agency
views regarding the meaning of statutes that have traditionally been
enforced by the courts, such as the criminal law or the antitrust laws.
Conceivably, one could operate with two standards of review—de novo
review for the APA, criminal law, and statutes like the antitrust laws, and
Chevron review for statutes a particular agency has been ―charged‖ or
―entrusted‖ with administering. But this simple move became untenable
once the Court, in a series of post-Chevron decisions, reaffirmed that there
are in fact two deference doctrines, even in cases where agencies have in
some sense been singled out as having authority to administer the statute.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) proved to be the
key stumbling block. Some years before Chevron, the Court had adopted
the discretionary standard of review articulated by Justice Jackson in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.42 for purposes of reviewing a statutory
interpretation by the EEOC.43 Skidmore deference, as it came to be called,
requires courts to consider a number of contextual factors that make an
agency interpretation more or less persuasive to the court.44 Some years
after Chevron, over Justice Scalia‘s objections, the Court reaffirmed that
Skidmore was the proper standard for evaluating EEOC interpretations.45
This was followed by other decisions which also applied or reaffirmed
Skidmore in a variety of employment-related contexts. The most prominent
of these decisions, Christensen v. Harris County,46 found all but Justice
Scalia reaffirming the continued vitality of Skidmore deference in
appropriate circumstances, although, as I will discuss momentarily, it also
revealed some deep schisms about the proper way to understand the
relationship between Chevron and Skidmore.
Once it became clear that the Court was committed to applying two
different deference doctrines when an agency has been ―entrusted‖ in some
sense with administration of the statute, some kind of Step Zero became
inevitable. The full menu of review standards included three options:
sometimes de novo review was appropriate (as in cases involving the
meaning of the APA or where courts act as the implementing body);
sometimes Skidmore was appropriate (as in cases reviewing agencies like
the EEOC); and sometimes Chevron was appropriate (as in cases involving
the EPA and the like). Obviously, a court should determine which standard
is appropriate before it undertakes to resolve the question at hand. The
invalidated a regulation of the Department of Health and Human Services for violating
RFRA; no suggestion was made by any Justice that the agency was entitled to deference for
its interpretation of the Act. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014).
42. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
43. The Court adopted Skidmore as the standard for reviewing EEOC interpretations in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–46 (1976).
44. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
45. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–58 (1991).
46. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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process of sorting out the relevant scope of these divergent standards
required the development of something like Step Zero.
A third reason why a threshold inquiry became imperative was that
multiple conflicts and controversies emerged over time about the scope of
the Chevron doctrine. In our 2001 article, Hickman and I counted fourteen
unresolved questions about Chevron‘s domain.47 I will not repeat the full
list. Examples included: whether Chevron applies to statutes enforced by
multiple agencies; whether Chevron applies to interpretations set forth in
interpretative rules or opinion letters; whether Chevron applies to
interpretations offered by lower-level employees in an agency; whether
Chevron applies to agency interpretations that conflict with judicial
precedent; and whether Chevron applies to agency interpretations about the
scope of the agency‘s authority—the issue presented in City of Arlington.48
As time passed, additional important conflicts emerged, such as whether
Chevron applies to agency judgments about the preemptive effect of a
statutory provision.49
Conceivably, the Supreme Court could resolve these conflicts on an ad
hoc basis, or simply leave them to fester in the lower courts. But a much
better solution would be to adopt a principled understanding of the
threshold conditions for the application of the Chevron doctrine, which
could then be applied by lower courts in sorting out, as they arise, the many
issues about the proper scope of Chevron. A principled understanding of
Step Zero would go far toward bringing the burgeoning discord about
Chevron‘s domain under control.
In short, three mutually supporting reasons emerged after 1984, each of
which suggested that Chevron-style review is appropriate in some
circumstances but not others. By the time oral argument was held in City of
Arlington, the Court itself had taken to calling this threshold inquiry Step
Zero.50
II. THE CONTENT OF STEP ZERO
In the last decade of the twentieth century, starting in roughly the tenth
year of Our Chevron, the Supreme Court began to intimate what Step Zero
might look like. As previously noted, Chevron itself had spoken about
express and implied ―delegations‖ of interpretative authority.51 Justice
Scalia, in a law review article (written shortly after he joined the Court) had
opined that Chevron rests on a ―fiction[]‖ of congressional intent to
delegate interpretational authority to agencies to fill in the gaps created by

47. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 848–52.
48. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013).
49. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
50. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (Nos. 11–
1545, 11–1547) (Breyer, J.); id. at 8 (Scalia, J.); id. at 11, 26 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 28
(Sotomayor, J.).
51. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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unclear statutes.52 The Court‘s Chevron decisions also began to speak more
consistently of Chevron deference being a function of delegated authority
from Congress.53
This, of course, left open the critical question: What kind of delegated
authority should count as an (implied) delegation of interpretational
authority? One possibility, fleshed out in a law review article by John
Duffy, was that delegated authority to promulgate legislative rules is the
key.54 As Duffy observed, if Congress has delegated legislative rulemaking
authority to an agency, and the agency uses this authority to resolve an
ambiguity in a statute, the questions on review should be (a) whether the
legislative rule conflicts with the statute and (b) if not, whether the rule is
arbitrary and capricious.55 This is essentially Chevron Step One and Step
Two. This was nifty, but it failed to account for many decisions in which
courts had applied Chevron in reviewing interpretations adopted in other
decisional formats, such as adjudication.
A. Christensen v. Harris County
Justice Thomas‘s opinion for the Court in Christensen v. Harris County56
spoke more broadly about Chevron being the appropriate standard when an
agency interprets a statute in a decision that has ―the force of law,‖ which
he indicated by example would include ―formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking.‖57
This seemed to track a report of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, which similarly
recommended that Chevron be limited to interpretations rendered with
some degree of procedural formality, such as formal adjudication and
notice-and-comment rulemaking.58 Justice Thomas in Christensen declined
to give Chevron deference to a Department of Labor opinion letter about the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, because the letter was merely
advisory and did not have the force of law. Instead, the Department was
entitled to Skidmore deference, asking whether its views were persuasive.
Justice Thomas concluded that the Department‘s interpretation was not
persuasive, and therefore it was rejected.59
Foreshadowing future fissures, Justices Scalia and Breyer filed separate
opinions in Christensen offering different views about the proper scope of
Chevron. Justice Scalia argued that there was only one deference
doctrine—Chevron. Skidmore was an ―anachronism‖ and should be
52. See Scalia, supra note 36, at 517.
53. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (―A precondition to
deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority.‖).
54. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV.
113, 199–202 (1998).
55. Id. at 202–03.
56. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
57. Id. at 587.
58. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS, RECOMMENDATION 89-5: ACHIEVING JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF AGENCY
STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS 31–33 (1989).
59. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
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relegated to the dustbin of history.60 Chevron should apply whenever the
court has the benefit of the ―authoritative‖ view of the agency about the
meaning of a statutory gap or ambiguity.61 This was satisfied in
Christensen, he said, because the Acting Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor had announced the interpretation
in an opinion letter, and this had been defended by the Solicitor General in
an amicus brief cosigned by the Solicitor of Labor.62
Justice Breyer also thought there was only one deference doctrine, but
that it was the doctrine applied in Skidmore. Chevron had not rendered
Skidmore an anachronism; indeed it ―made no relevant change‖ in
deference doctrine.63 Chevron should be understood simply as a decision
that ―focused upon an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to
certain agency determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated to the
agency the legal authority to make those determinations.‖64 As to the scope
of this additional factor supporting deference, Justice Breyer said, oddly
enough, that Justice Scalia ―may well be right‖ that that the opinion letter
was enough to elicit Chevron deference.65
Hickman and I published our article on Step Zero shortly after
Christensen was decided. The article was intended to function as a
restatement of the law of Chevron, rather than as a pitch for an ideal
regime.66
Building on the growing consensus supporting implied
delegation as the foundation of Chevron, we sought to unpack what kind of
agency interpretations could fairly be said to represent an exercise of
delegated interpretational authority. Taking a cue from the majority
opinion in Christensen and other decisions by the Court, we argued that two
conditions should be met. First, Congress must have delegated authority to
the agency to act with the ―force of law,‖ either by conferring power on the
agency to issue legislative regulations or binding adjudications.67 Second,
the interpretation in question must have been made by the agency in the
exercise of this authority—that is, it must have been rendered in a
legislative rule or an adjudication that yields a self-enforcing order.68
We argued that a delegation of authority to act with the force of law, in
contrast to other types of delegations, is an appropriate signal that Congress
intended the agency, rather than the courts, to play the primary role in
making policy. Not every agency and not every agency function is given
authority to bind persons outside the agency with the force of law.
60. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
61. Id. at 591.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. In earlier writing, I advocated that Chevron be discarded in favor of an approach that
would treat agency interpretations as a form of ―inter-branch‖ precedent. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992). By 2001, it
was clear that Chevron was not going away.
67. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 874–89.
68. Id.
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Restricting Chevron to agencies that have been delegated such authority
narrows the scope of delegated authority to a subset of agencies and agency
functions where one can plausibly say that Congress has conferred highly
significant powers on the agency.69
We further argued that limiting Chevron to interpretations rendered by
the agency in the exercise of delegated authority to act with the force of law
was necessary to preserve the limitations on congressional delegations.
Giving Chevron-style deference to interpretations rendered in non-binding
formats like opinion letters or amicus briefs would in effect allow agencies
to leverage their delegated authority beyond the limits prescribed by
Congress.70
Finally, we said that requiring the interpretation emerge through legally
binding agency action would tend to limit Chevron to circumstances in
which some kind of relatively formal public process has been followed in
rendering an interpretation. We noted that the match would not be perfect,
since agencies can, for example, forego notice-and-comment procedures for
good cause in issuing legislative rules.71 Still, the ―force of law‖ limitation
would tend in the large run of cases to reinforce the correlation between
Chevron deference and the use of some kind of process in which public
input occurs at the agency level.
The article, perhaps unfortunately, did not probe deeply into what it
means for an agency to act with the ―force of law.‖ We did say that it refers
to the capacity of an agency to compel behavior by persons outside the
agency, on pain of suffering adverse consequences (sanctions) for failing to
conform to the agency edict.72 We said that the only types of agency action
that have the force of law in this sense are legislative regulations and selfexecuting adjudications.73 And we tried to make clear that, although
agency action having the force of law has certain consequences for the
procedures agencies must follow (subject to exceptions for good cause,
etc.), and that action having the force of law should have certain
consequences for the degree of deference a court gives the agency, neither
the procedures the agency employs nor the deference the court gives the
agency determines whether its action has the force of law.74 In hindsight,
we should have made more of an effort to clarify that agency action has the
force of law when Congress and the agency intend that the agency‘s action
will have the force of law, i.e., both the delegator and the delegatee intend
that agency action will compel certain behavior by persons outside the
agency. The procedures an agency follows may provide evidence of the
69. Id. at 876.
70. Id. at 883–84.
71. Id. at 885; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012) (exempting rules related to military
affairs and agency personnel management or loans or grants from notice-and-comment
requirements); id. § 553(b) (exempting interpretative rules, statements of policy or
organizational rules from notice-and-comment, and allowing agencies to forego notice-andcomment for good cause).
72. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 881.
73. Id. at 882.
74. Id.
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agency‘s intent, but the procedures do not themselves give agency action
the force of law. Similarly, the deference a court gives to an agency‘s
action does not give the agency‘s action the force of law. The case law and
the commentary have exhibited considerable confusion on these points,75
and our relatively brief treatment would have been more useful had we
acknowledged the confusion and made a more sustained effort to explain
how agency action having the force of law exists independently of agency
procedures and judicial review.
B. United States v. Mead Corp.
The three-way split over the proper scope of the Chevron doctrine in
Christensen evidently persuaded the Court that better guidance was
required. The vehicle the Court selected for providing such guidance,
United States v. Mead Corp.,76 was an unfortunate choice. Mead involved
a very idiosyncratic administrative process called tariff classification
rulings. These rulings did not correspond to any of the more familiar
modes of administrative action, such as legislative rules, interpretative
rules, opinion letters, adjudications, and so forth.77 They were letter rulings
issued by the Customs Service in response to a request by an importer for
advice as to what tariff applies to a proposed importation of goods. The
implementing regulations specified that these rulings were ―binding on all
Customs Service personnel.‖78 But they did not bind anyone outside the
agency, including the importer who sought the ruling, who could pay the
tariff stated in the letter and then sue for a refund. Nor were these rulings
regarded as controlling for any other importation of goods, however
similar.79 In effect, they were a safe pass given to an importer for purposes
of a single importation of goods. Typically, no public notice or opportunity
to comment was provided before tariff classification rulings were issued,
nor was the importer entitled to a hearing beyond the request for a ruling
and the responsive letter.80 Tariff classification rulings were extremely
numerous; forty-six different Customs Service offices issued over ten
thousand rulings every year.81 Given the oddball nature of tariff
classification rulings, it was hard to see how a decision whether Chevron
should apply to an interpretation reflected in such a ruling would generalize
to other, more typical modes of administrative action.
The Court in Mead nevertheless gamely sought to synthesize a general
understanding about the threshold conditions for applying Chevron. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Souter, commanded eight votes,
including those of Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer. The Souter opinion
75. See generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4 (5th
ed. 2010).
76. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
77. See id. at 221–22.
78. 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (2000).
79. Id. § 177.9(c).
80. Mead, 533 U.S. at 223, 233.
81. Id. at 224.
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reaffirmed or settled a number of contested questions. It reaffirmed that
federal administrative law includes two deference doctrines, the one
articulated in Chevron and the one expressed in Skidmore.82 It reaffirmed
that the ultimate touchstone for determining the proper standard of review is
the intent of Congress, and that courts must decide, exercising de novo
review, which standard applies.83 It reaffirmed the proposition set forth in
Christensen that Chevron applies only to agency interpretations that have
the ―force of law.‖84 It even seemed to endorse the two-part exegesis
advanced in the Merrill/Hickman article (which appeared before Mead was
decided and was cited by the Court in a footnote85), stating: ―We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority.‖86 In short, Mead held that Chevron is subject to a Step
Zero inquiry, that the inquiry entails asking whether the agency has been
delegated authority to act with the force of law, and that the interpretation
must have been made in the exercise of such authority to qualify for
Chevron deference.87 All this, in my view, was positive.
Otherwise, the majority opinion was a mess. The opinion left readers
wondering whether having the force of law was an independent criterion,
with certain consequences following for the required package of procedures
in the usual case (but not always), or whether following certain procedures
was in fact the test for determining whether action has the force of law.88
Justice Souter was also clearly troubled by the question whether the oddduck tariff classification rulings could fairly be characterized as ―law,‖
given that they are a one-way day ticket having no precedential value, and
can be issued, potentially in contradictory terms, by forty-six different
regional offices.89 But he had been given little guidance as to what it means
for agency action to be ―law.‖ For ordinary administrative law purposes, it
is generally good enough to say that agency action has the ―force of law‖
when it binds actors outside the agency.90 Justice Souter evidently wanted
to probe more deeply, yet he did not have the material at hand to do so in
more than a very suggestive fashion. All of which left lower courts and
commentators scratching their heads.
82. Id. at 227–28, 234–35.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 226–27.
85. Id. at 230 n.11.
86. Id. at 226–27.
87. Id.
88. E.g., id. at 230 (―It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force.‖).
89. Id. at 232–34.
90. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302, 309 (1979) (distinguishing
binding rules that affect ―individual rights and obligations‖ from those that merely regulate
an agency‘s ―own affairs‖).

2014]

STEP ZERO AFTER CITY OF ARLINGTON

767

Two other factors, beyond the idiosyncratic facts, help explain the
maddening application of Step Zero in Mead. One was that Justice Souter
likely was eager to secure the votes of both the Justices who had joined
Justice Thomas‘s majority opinion in Christensen, which had viewed
Chevron as distinct deference doctrine based on implied delegation,91 but
also the votes of the three Justices who had joined Justice Breyer‘s dissent
in Christensen, which had stated that Chevron had ―made no relevant
change‖ in traditional deference doctrine other than to add a new factor to
the conventional mix of variables determining how much deference is owed
to an agency in any particular instance.92 This required Justice Souter to
embrace both the understanding that Chevron rests on a delegation of
interpretational authority to the agency, while simultaneously offering up a
―Skidmore-ized‖ version of Chevron compatible with Justice Breyer‘s
views about the need to consider multiple contextual factors in deciding
how much deference to give to agency interpretations in any particular case.
The second factor producing confusion was that Justice Souter appeared
anxious to avoid casting doubt on any of the many dozens of Supreme
Court decisions that previously had cited Chevron in reviewing an agency
action. In other words, he sought to state the threshold condition for
applying Chevron in such a way that every prior Supreme Court decision
could be viewed as having correctly anticipated the newly-articulated
threshold condition.93 This was misguided and unnecessary, given that the
question whether Chevron was the correct standard of review had not been
at issue in these cases. Nevertheless, by suggesting that Step Zero had been
satisfied in every prior Chevron decision, Justice Souter left the threshold
inquiry so flabby that even opinion letters might qualify in certain
circumstances, contrary to Christensen.94
Justice Scalia penned a lengthy and vitriolic dissent, which no other
Justice joined. It is clear that Justice Scalia was primarily exercised by the
perpetuation of Skidmore as an alternative to Chevron. Justice Scalia has
long viewed Skidmore as a mushy standard—one he sarcastically
characterized in Mead as ―th‘ol‘ ‗totality of the circumstances‘ test‖—
whereas he regards Chevron as a much more rule-like formulation.95
Justice Scalia prefers rules over standards, in significant part because he
believes they constrain willful decision making by judges eager to impose
their policy preferences on society.96 Since the other eight Justices were all
committed to the perpetuation of Skidmore in some circumstances, these
fulminations fell on deaf ears. Justice Scalia also complained, with greater
91. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
93. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31.
94. The Court stated that ―interpretive rules . . . enjoy no Chevron status as a class,‖ id.
at 232, yet it also cited a decision applying Chevron to an opinion letter and said that the lack
of formal procedures ―does not alone‖ bar the application of Chevron. Id. at 231 (citing
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995)).
95. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
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justification, that the majority opinion was maddeningly imprecise about
what sorts of agency actions would be entitled to Chevron review.97 To
quell this complaint, Justice Souter should have said that Chevron is
triggered when Congress gives authority to agencies to make legislative
rules or to render self-executing adjudications, and the agency interprets the
statute in the exercise of these delegated powers, and left it at that.
For a while, it appeared that Mead had sowed greater confusion about the
scope of Chevron than it had eliminated. Lower courts and commentators
were predictably confused by the all-things-considered aspects of the
decision.98 Did this refer to the inquiry at Step Zero, or had Chevron been
displaced by or merged with Skidmore, turning every deference decision
into an all-things-considered inquiry? Matters were made worse when, a
year later, Justice Breyer penned a majority opinion in a Social Security
case that seemed to invoke Skidmore-like variables in determining whether
Chevron applies, and even suggested that Mead had dispensed with any
―absolute rule‖ in favor of an ad hoc balancing test.99
Gradually, however, decisions began accumulating at the Court in which
Mead‘s two-part test was treated as a controlling statement of law regarding
the conditions for applying Chevron. Summarizing broadly, these decisions
recognize that agency action is eligible for Chevron deference only if it has
the ―force of law,‖ without offering any clarification of precisely what this
means.
For example, notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
adjudication are treated as presumptively having the force of law,100 while
interpretative rules, internal guidance documents, and repealed rules are
recognized as beyond the pale.101
Nevertheless, those aspects of Mead that appeared to endorse a
―Skidmore-ized‖ Chevron continue to pop up in opinions authored by
Justice Breyer. For example, in Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke,102
the question was whether a Department of Labor regulation exempting
certain ―companionship services‖ from the Fair Labor Standards Act was
entitled to Chevron deference. Under the general two-part test of Mead, the
answer was simple: Congress had expressly delegated authority to the
Labor Department to ―define[] and delimit[]‖ companionship services by
regulation, and the Department had issued a regulation doing so.103 Writing

97. Mead, 533 U.S. at 245–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003).
99. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
100. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (interpretation in formal
adjudication entitled to Chevron deference).
101. See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1402 (2013) (enforcement
guideline no longer in effect not entitled to Chevron deference); Alaska Dep‘t of Envtl.
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487–88 (2004) (internal guidance entitled only to
respect); Wis. Dep‘t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002) (proposed
regulation entitled only to Skidmore deference).
102. 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
103. Id. at 172.
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for a unanimous Court applying Chevron, Justice Breyer nevertheless made
the inquiry much more complicated. As he summarized:
Where an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties,
where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the
agency uses full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule,
where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority, and
where the rule itself is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that
Congress intended it to defer to the agency‘s determination. See Mead.104

The notion that the agency‘s ―full and direct focus‖ on an issue and the
―reasonableness‖ of its rule are relevant to whether the Court should defer
to the agency‘s interpretation sounds like Skidmore, not Chevron.
The one constant in the Court‘s post-Mead decisions—at least until City
of Arlington—was Justice Scalia‘s continued condemnation of the decision.
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services,105 which held that agencies eligible for Chevron deference under
Mead can effectively overrule prior judicial interpretations, Justice Scalia
launched another vitriolic assault on Mead.106 He continued his campaign
against Mead in separate opinions in several other decisions.107 None of
these diatribes gathered the support of any other Justice. Looking at the
bigger picture, if one filters out the noise generated by Justices Breyer and
Scalia—both of whom harbor idiosyncratic views about Chevron not shared
by other Justices—support for Mead on the Court today is solid.
C.

City of Arlington v. FCC

I come then to the Court‘s decision in City of Arlington v. FCC. The
underlying question in the case concerned the meaning of an amendment to
the Federal Communications Act adopted in 1996 that requires local land
use agencies to process applications to construct or expand wireless
transmission towers ―within a reasonable period of time.‖108 The statute
provided that parties who believe requests are not being processed within a
reasonable time could seek relief in a ―court of competent jurisdiction.‖109
There was not a word in the amendment about FCC implementation or
enforcement of the reasonable time mandate. After initially disclaiming
authority under the statute, the FCC changed its mind and issued a
declaratory order interpreting reasonable time presumptively to mean no
more than ninety days in the case of a tower expansion or 150 days in the
case of new construction of a wireless tower.110 The Fifth Circuit, in
104. Id. at 173–74.
105. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
106. Id. at 1014–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 296
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 244–45 (2005)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Raymond Yates M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Herndon, 541 U.S.
1, 24 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012).
109. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
110. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 234–36 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 1863 (2013).
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reviewing a challenge to the declaratory order by several local
governments, recognized that the case presented a question about whether
the FCC had ―jurisdiction‖ to interpret the reasonable time provision.111
Following circuit precedent, it held that Chevron applied to jurisdictional
questions, and it deferred to the FCC‘s interpretation that it had
jurisdiction.112 It also applied Chevron on the merits, and upheld the FCC‘s
time limits as a permissible interpretation of ―reasonable period of time.‖113
The Court granted review limited to the question whether ―a court should
apply Chevron to review an agency‘s interpretation of its own
jurisdiction.‖114 It declined to review whether the FCC had jurisdiction to
limit or affect state and local zoning authority over the placement of
wireless service facilities.115 In other words, the Court agreed to decide the
abstract ―meta-question‖ whether courts should apply Chevron to agencies‘
interpretations of their own authority, but nothing else.116 Five Justices
joined in an opinion by Justice Scalia answering the meta-question in the
affirmative. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dissented.
For Justice Scalia and the majority, the case was about preserving the
workability of the decisional framework set forth in Chevron. The primary
thrust of the opinion, which had been previewed years earlier by Justice
Scalia in separate writing,117 was that there is no principled distinction
between agency statutory interpretations that are jurisdictional and those
which are not. Justice Scalia heaped scorn on the jurisdictionalnonjurisdictional distinction, calling it ―a mirage,‖ an ―empty distraction,‖ a
―bogeyman,‖ ―specious,‖ and caricaturing the opposing view as urging a
distinction between ―big, important‖ decisions and ―humdrum, run-of-the
mill stuff.‖118 He cited numerous Supreme Court decisions in which
―jurisdictional questions‖ had been resolved by applying or citing
Chevron.119 He did not acknowledge the supreme irony that somehow he
111. Id. at 247–48.
112. Id. at 249–54.
113. Id. at 255–60.
114. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at Questions Presented, City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct.
1863 (No. 11-1545), 2012 WL 2516693.
115. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012) (granting certiorari limited to the
first question).
116. It was, in my view, unwise for the Court to limit its consideration to the abstract
question about the scope of ―Chevron.‖ Petitioners‘ counsel was repeatedly interrupted at
oral argument by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg with questions about the merits of the FCC‘s
interpretation of ―reasonable time,‖ Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50, at 5–7, 20–
25, and Justice Breyer ultimately based his concurrence in the judgment on his assessment of
the merits of the regulation. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. A consideration of
the merits would also have illuminated why the decision had been identified without any
difficulty by both the FCC and the Fifth Circuit as being ―jurisdictional,‖ which in turn
would have required more effort by the majority to dismiss the distinction between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions as a ―false dichotomy.‖ City of Arlington, 133
S. Ct. at 1872.
117. Most notably, Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S.
354, 381–82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
118. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868–73.
119. Id. at 1871–72.
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could identify these cases as posing ―jurisdictional questions,‖ even while
professing that the distinction was meaningless. Nor did he note that nearly
all these decisions were ―drive-by‖ precedents in which the jurisdictionalnonjurisdictional distinction had not been discussed.
The clinching argument for the majority, however, was not so much that
the jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional line was meaningless. Rather it was that
the line would be manipulated by litigants and lower courts to recapture for
the judiciary authority to make policy that Chevron had ceded to agencies.
As Justice Scalia wrote:
Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself. Savvy
challengers of agency action would play the ―jurisdictional‖ card in every
case. Some judges would be deceived by the specious, but scarysounding ―jurisdictional‖-―nonjurisdictional‖ line; others tempted by the
prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning of
ambiguous statutory commands. The effect would be to transfer any
number of interpretative decisions—archetypical Chevron questions,
about how best to construe an ambiguous term in light of competing
policy interests—from the agencies that administer the statutes to federal
courts.120

In other words, Justice Scalia saw the case as an assault on Chevron
motivated by a desire to return to some imagined golden age of judicial
activism in administrative law.
It is not my purpose here to offer a point-by-point rebuttal of Justice
Scalia‘s opinion. But I cannot resist several observations.
First, the APA specifically instructs reviewing courts to decide ―all
relevant questions of law.‖121 Although ignored in Chevron, this provision
can be reconciled with deference to agency interpretations of law under a
theory of implied delegation of interpretational authority. When Congress
delegates policy authority to an agency with respect to a particular statutory
provision, this can be seen as an implied instruction to courts to accept
reasonable agency interpretations of that provision. In effect, the APA‘s
general command instructing courts to exercise independent judgment in
deciding questions of law requires the court to accept reasonable
interpretations of the agency, because Congress has given the agency
authority to make policy judgments with respect to the provision in
question. However, the APA also enjoins reviewing courts to ―hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right.‖122 This command cannot be reconciled with deference
to agency interpretations of the scope of their own jurisdiction on a theory
of implied delegation, since the very question at issue is whether such a
delegation does or does not exist. The text of the APA therefore seems
plainly to require that courts exercise independent judgment about whether
the agency is acting ―in excess of statutory jurisdiction.‖ Justice Scalia,
120. Id. at 1873 (citations omitted).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
122. Id. § 706(2)(C) (emphasis added).
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ordinarily a master at statutory exegesis, made no effort to square his
extension of Chevron to questions of agency jurisdiction with the text of the
APA.
Second, Justice Scalia acknowledged that there is a ―very real division‖
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions insofar as judicial
jurisdiction is concerned.123 He nevertheless insisted that this did not carry
over to agencies. The explanation he gave was that judicial decisions made
outside a court‘s jurisdiction are ultra vires whereas erroneous judicial
decisions made within the court‘s jurisdiction are not.124 In contrast, he
insisted, any agency decision contrary to law is ultra vires.125 This may be,
but Justice Scalia‘s proffered distinction does not explain why the
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional line is conceptually meaningful in the one
context but not in the other. If courts can apply the jurisdictionalnonjurisdictional distinction in deciding whether a judicial judgment is ultra
vires, why are they incapable of applying the same distinction in deciding
whether agency action is ultra vires?126
Third, Justice Scalia dismissed out of hand the idea that discerning the
limits of the FCC‘s authority had anything to do with federalism. 127 The
only thing at issue, he said, was the meaning of a federal statute, and the
question was whether its ambiguity should be resolved by a federal agency
or a federal court. This, he insisted, was simply a separation of powers
question, not a question of federalism.128 But, in fact, the underlying
dispute involved the exercise of local land use authority, unquestionably a
matter of traditional state and local concern. Congress had partially
preempted such authority by requiring that applications for wireless towers
had to be resolved in a reasonable period of time. But it stipulated that
aside from this specific constraint, nothing in the amendment was to limit
the authority of state and local governments over siting decisions.129 And
Congress instructed that the reasonable time limit was to be enforced by
―courts of competent jurisdiction.‖130 In the context of local land use
disputes, the phrase ―courts of competent jurisdiction‖ invariably means
state courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve appeals from local

123. 133 S. Ct. at 1868–69.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1869.
126. In some contexts, judicial jurisdiction is governed by statutes which are wholly
separate from whatever law governs the decision on the merits. Federal diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is an obvious example: the statute governing jurisdiction speaks of
the residence of the parties, whereas the merits are determined by applying the appropriate
state substantive law. But in other contexts, such as determining whether federal question
jurisdiction exists, the very same statute that establishes jurisdiction also governs the
resolution of a claim on the merits. Yet courts somehow manage to resolve the question
whether a federal question is presented without confounding this with the resolution of the
merits.
127. 133 S. Ct. at 1873.
128. Id.
129. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012).
130. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
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zoning boards.131 The FCC‘s interpretation transformed a general standard,
whose meaning Congress intended local zoning boards and state courts
define on a case-by-case basis, into a presumption that local agencies must
abide by specific deadlines established by federal law. This interpretation
expanded the scope of preemption—necessarily contracting state and local
land use authority. Justice Scalia made no mention of the fact that the
Court has consistently rejected the application of Chevron to preemption
questions,132 precisely because those questions have a pronounced effect on
the balance of authority between the federal government and the states.133
Fourth, Justice Scalia had little to say in response to the central theme of
the Chief Justice‘s dissent, namely, that deferring to agency interpretations
of the scope of their own authority undermines the role of the courts in
assuring that agencies act within the boundaries laid down by Congress.134
The solution to the ―fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome,‖ according to Justice
Scalia, was for courts to strictly enforce statutes at Chevron‘s Step One.135
What this means, if taken seriously, is that agency power will be limited
only when Congress has legislated unambiguously to limit it. In other
words, it is up to Congress to draft better statutes if the administrative state
is to be held in check. With many challenges to significant rulemaking by
the Obama administration on the horizon (by the EPA, as it undertakes to
regulate greenhouse gases without clear statutory authority, or under the
many rulemakings mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act), one wonders if this
131. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, widely adopted throughout the country,
provides that appeals from zoning decisions and ordinances are to be filed ―in the circuit
court of the county in which the premises affected are located.‖ See 5 KENNETH H. YOUNG,
ANDERSON‘S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 34.31 (4th ed. & Supp. 2008) (reproducing
statute). The federal statute requiring that wireless tower siting decisions be made in a
reasonable time would presumably suffice to create federal question jurisdiction over an
action challenging the pace of the local zoning process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). Any
such action might give rise, however, to a demand for federal court abstention under
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), or some
other abstention doctrine. Even federal constitutional challenges to zoning decisions must
generally be channeled through state courts, see Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), which means they are generally
immune from challenge in federal district courts. See San Remo Hotel v. City of San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (relitigating issues decided by state court is precluded in
federal court).
In practice, therefore, litigation over local zoning decisions is
overwhelmingly a state court affair.
132. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009).
133. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996) (describing preemption of
state law as ―a serious intrusion into state sovereignty‖).
134. In a curious footnote, Justice Scalia chastised the Chief Justice for characterizing
agencies as exercising ―legislative‖ and ―judicial‖ power. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S.
Ct. 1863, 1873 n.4 (2013). He acknowledged that agencies ―make rules‖ and ―conduct
adjudications,‖ but he insisted that under the Constitution all legislative power is reserved for
Congress and the judicial power is reserved for the federal courts. Id. As he has in other
decisions, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001), Justice
Scalia seemed to suggest that the massive accumulation of power by federal administrative
agencies, even if a matter of ―discomfort,‖ is of no constitutional concern as long as the
correct label (―executive‖) is attached to federal administrative action. City of Arlington, 133
S. Ct. at 1873 n.4.
135. 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
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expansion of executive authority partially explains why Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan signed on to the Scalia opinion.
Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, which must be a puzzle to observers not familiar with his
previously expressed views about Chevron. Justice Breyer agreed that the
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional distinction is ―a mirage.‖136 But he insisted
that ambiguity is not enough to infer a delegation of authority to an agency
to exercise primary interpretational authority. He cited Mead for the
proposition that Chevron applies when the agency acts with the force of
law, and he agreed that courts must resolve this question independently,
without deferring to the agency‘s view.137 But he also quoted from his
opinion in Barnhart v. Walton138 for the proposition that a variety of
contextual factors are relevant in determining whether an agency acts with
the force of law.139 Although it is difficult to be sure, Justice Breyer
appears to regard the phrase ―force of law‖ as a label stating the conclusion
that ―Chevron applies‖ (or perhaps ―the court should defer‖), and that in
making this determination all kinds of Skidmore-like contextual factors are
relevant. This is essentially a convoluted way of expressing the view he
maintained in Christensen, which is that Skidmore captures the basic
deference doctrine, and Chevron merely stands for the proposition that
congressional delegation of power to the agency is one factor among many
to consider in determining whether to defer.140
Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito,
deserves to enter the annals as one of the classic statements of
administrative law.
His disagreement with the majority was
―fundamental.‖141 Deferring to agencies about the scope of their own
authority would significantly undermine a central reason Congress has
provided for judicial review in the first place, namely, to assure that
agencies do not stray from their delegated mandate. As he summed up in
his opening paragraph: ―A court should not defer to an agency until the
court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference.‖142
The Chief Justice sought to deflect Justice Scalia‘s debunking of the
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional line by admitting that ―jurisdiction‖ is a
word of many meanings and that the ―parties, amici, and court below too
often use the term ‗jurisdiction‘ imprecisely.‖143 The correct way to frame

136. Id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
137. Id.
138. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
139. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875.
140. Justice Breyer ultimately concurred in the judgment on the ground that he believed
the FCC had determined correctly that it has authority to interpret the meaning of the phrase
―reasonable period of time,‖ id. at 1876–77—which of course was a question the Court had
declined to review.
141. Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1879. In defense of the ―amici‖ (one of whom I represented, see supra *), the
question presented on which the Court granted review spoke in terms of agency
―jurisdiction.‖ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at Questions Presented, City of Arlington, 133
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the inquiry, according the Chief Justice, was whether ―Congress has granted
the agency interpretative authority over the statutory ambiguity at issue.‖144
Moreover, this question must be addressed in terms of the specific
provision before the court. If Congress has delegated authority to the
agency to implement or enforce this provision with the force of law, and the
agency has done so, then Chevron applies in assessing the agency‘s
interpretation.145 But if Congress has not delegated authority to the agency
over the provision in question, or the agency has not exercised this authority
in rendering its interpretation, then Chevron should not apply.
By way of illustration, the Chief Justice pointed out that many statutes,
including the Americans with Disabilities Act146 and the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act147, ―parcel out authority to
multiple agencies.‖148 Clearly, courts must determine, using independent
judgment, whether an agency opining on the meaning of a provision in one
of these statutes is in fact the one to which delegated authority has been
given. He conceded that ―[a] general delegation to the agency to administer
the statute will often suffice to satisfy the court that Congress has delegated
interpretative authority over the ambiguity at issue.‖149 But he added, ―if
Congress has exempted particular provisions from that authority, that
exemption must be respected, and the determination whether Congress has
done so is for the courts alone.‖150
With respect to Justice Scalia‘s fears of judicial manipulation of the
inquiry into the scope of agency authority, and of potential judicial
intrusion into the policymaking sphere of the agencies, the Chief Justice
responded that larger considerations of constitutional structure were at
stake. The judiciary is obligated not only to confine itself to its proper role,
but also ―to ensure that the other branches do so as well.‖151 The court
should not abdicate its basic task of fixing the ―boundaries of delegated
authority.‖152 ―Our duty to police the boundary between the Legislature
and the Executive is as critical as our duty to respect that between the
Judiciary and the Executive. . . . We do not leave it to the agency to decide
when it is in charge.‖153

S. Ct. 1863 (No. 11-1545), 2012 WL 2516693. It is hazardous to insist that the Court should
consider a different question than the one it has agreed to hear.
144. 133 S. Ct. at 1880 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1880–81.
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
147. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
148. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1883–84 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1884.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1886.
152. Id. (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 27 (1983)).
153. Id.
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III. SECURING STEP ZERO
Many administrative law scholars have expressed concern that Chevronstyle judicial review can undermine what I have called the judicial function
of boundary maintenance, and they have accordingly urged that courts
should continue to exercise independent judgment to assure that the agency
is acting within the scope of its delegated authority.154 Step Zero, which
asks whether Congress has delegated interpretational authority to the
agency, could readily be augmented by adding an inquiry into whether the
agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority or ―jurisdiction.‖
By rejecting any inquiry into agency ―jurisdiction‖ before turning to
Chevron, the majority in City of Arlington has seemingly dealt a blow to
such a conception of Step Zero. Or perhaps not. I argue that Step Zero is in
fact more secure after City of Arlington than ever before. What is more,
City of Arlington may have planted the seeds for a meaningful inquiry into
the scope of an agency‘s regulatory authority as part of Step Zero.
Ironically, City of Arlington has done more than any decision since Mead
to secure the core content of Step Zero as a basic limitation on the scope of
the Chevron doctrine. The strategy of the government in City of Arlington,
both in its brief and in Solicitor General Donald Verrilli‘s oral argument,
was to convince the Court that the two Mead factors provide a fully
adequate statement of the threshold conditions for application of Chevron.
The slogan of the government‘s presentation might read: ―All you need is
Mead.‖ The first thing Verrilli said when he stood up at oral argument was
to reaffirm Mead as a basic precondition for the application of Chevron
deference.155 In response to a question from Justice Sotomayor, he
acknowledged that this threshold determination had to be made by the court
exercising de novo review.156 He followed this up with effective jabs at the
petitioners‘ position, suggesting that any exception for jurisdictional
questions would turn the interpretation of the Chevron doctrine ―into the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code.‖157 As he put it at one point:
[W]hat my friends on the other side are asking is, actually, for an
additional layer of complexity in the analysis, even after the general
authority is established to . . . make rules with the force of law and even
after it‘s established that the rule at issue . . . has been done in the exercise
of that . . . authority to act with the force of law.158

154. E.g., Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497; Ernest
Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989
(1999); Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in
Administrative Law, 41 WM & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1466–67 (2000); Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 11, at 837; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983). For opposing views, see Sunstein, supra note 31, at 234–36;
Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations That Delimit
the Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 958 (1994).
155. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50, at 30.
156. Id. at 35–36.
157. Id. at 40.
158. Id. at 41–42.
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The choice he depicted was between a straightforward, well-established
threshold inquiry—Mead—and ―Pandora‘s box.‖159
The characterization of a ―jurisdictional‖ inquiry as an additional layer of
doctrinal complexity in already-convoluted Chevron doctrine appears to
have been the winning argument. The multiple petitioners did not help
matters by filing briefs presenting divergent views of how to define a
―jurisdictional‖ question. The brief filed by the International Municipal
Lawyers Association (IMLA) in particular, which argued that jurisdictional
questions concern ―who, what, when, or where‖ as opposed to questions
about ―how,‖160 drew particular skepticism from the Justices. At oral
argument, petitioners‘ counsel, Tom Goldstein, repudiated this version of
the ―jurisdictional‖ inquiry, and attempted to reframe the question in terms
of whether Congress had delegated authority to interpret the particular
provision in question, along the lines ultimately adopted by Chief Justice
Roberts.161 But Justice Kagan demanded that Goldstein state whether his
position was the same or different than the one espoused in the IMLA brief.
When he said it was different, she was obviously unpersuaded.162 The
aversion to turning Chevron into ―the Internal Revenue Code‖ is, I believe,
the best explanation for how Justice Scalia got five votes to require judges
to defer to agency‘s views about the scope of their own authority. The
government made this step appear less radical than it was, in light of the
traditions of administrative law, by arguing that judicial enforcement of the
twin conditions required by Mead would guard against a runaway Chevron
doctrine.
Assuming that three and possibly all four of the Justices who joined
Justice Scalia‘s opinion did so, at least in part, because they were convinced
that ―all you need is Mead,‖ then we have the explanation for one of the
more startling aspects of Justice Scalia‘s opinion, namely, his endorsement
of Mead. Recall that Justice Scalia penned an extremely vigorous dissent in
Mead, reiterated his objections to Mead in the strongest terms in Brand X,
and continued to call for the overruling of Mead in subsequent decisions.163
In City of Arlington, all the vituperation about Mead suddenly disappeared.
Evidently the imperative of getting five votes to defeat the ―jurisdictional‖
limitation on Chevron was achieved at the price of capitulating on his
lonely crusade against Mead.
The surrender occurred late in the majority opinion in City of Arlington.
In a section of the opinion described as offering a ―few words in response to
the dissent,‖ Justice Scalia wrote: ―The dissent is correct that United States
v. Mead Corp. requires that, for Chevron deference to apply, the agency
must have received congressional authority to determine the particular

159. Id. at 33, 54.
160. Brief of Respondents International Municipal Lawyers Ass‘n, et al. at 21–35, City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (Nos. 11–1545, 11–1547), 2012 WL 5884820.
161. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50, at 11, 27.
162. Id. at 60–62.
163. See supra notes 95–97, 105–07 and accompanying text.
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matter at issue in the particular manner adopted. No one disputes that.‖164
In saying ―[n]o one disputes that,‖ Justice Scalia might be taken as simply
agreeing that no one disputes this is what Mead says. Justice Scalia
immediately proceeded, however, to distinguish Mead on the ground that
―Mead denied Chevron deference to action, by an agency with rulemaking
authority, that was not rulemaking.‖165 This moves beyond a mere
description of Mead and appears to reflect an acceptance of its core holding.
Recall that in his dissent in Mead, and before that in his opinion in
Christensen, Justice Scalia had argued that it did not matter whether an
agency interpretation was advanced in a format like rulemaking, as long as
it was the ―authoritative‖ view of the agency, even if set forth in an opinion
letter or amicus brief.166 He has evidently now abandoned that position.
An agency that has been delegated rulemaking authority must promulgate
the interpretation through rulemaking, or perhaps some other format of the
same degree of legal significance, i.e., one that has the force of law.
Any doubt about Justice Scalia‘s acceptance of Mead was laid to rest in
the next paragraph. After further rebuttal of the dissent, Justice Scalia
concluded with this statement: ―It suffices to decide this case that the
preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress
has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the
Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.‖167
Here we have an affirmative statement that Chevron has ―preconditions,‖
that one precondition is the delegation of power to administer a statute
through rulemaking or adjudication, and that another precondition is the
―promulgation‖ of the interpretation through an exercise of one of these
forms of delegated authority. This is very close, if not identical, to Mead.
Rulemaking (at least legislative rulemaking) and adjudication (at least
adjudication that produces self-executing orders) are the modes of agency
action that have the force of law. Whether Justice Scalia will continue, in
the future, to urge Chevron deference to modes of rulemaking and
adjudication that do not have the force of law (such as opinion letters or
government amicus briefs) remains to be seen.168 At the very least, he has
staked out a position in City of Arlington very different from what he
advocated in his dissent in Mead.
Justice Breyer of course joined the Court‘s opinion in Mead, although in
separate opinions before and after Mead he seemed to endorse a kind of
Skidmore-ized version of Chevron. In his concurrence in City of Arlington,
however, Justice Breyer unequivocally reaffirmed his commitment to
Mead. He stated flatly that, in deciding whether to defer to an agency
interpretation, a reviewing judge
164. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873–74 (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 60–62, 95–97, 105–07 and accompanying text.
167. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
168. It may be significant that Justice Scalia never repeats the ―force of law‖
characterization of the required type of delegated authority as it was expressed in Mead.
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will have to decide independently whether Congress delegated authority
to the agency to provide interpretations of, or to enact rules pursuant to,
the statute at issue—interpretations or rules that carry with them ―the
force of law.‖ United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). If
so, the reviewing court must give special leeway or ―deference‖ to the
agency‘s interpretation.169

As we have seen, Justice Breyer appears to harbor idiosyncratic views about
what it means for an agency to act with the ―force of law.‖ Be that as it
may, his separate opinion in City of Arlington puts him fully on board in
requiring that courts engage in Mead‘s analysis of Step Zero before they
invoke the type of deference associated with Chevron.
The bottom line is that, if there was any doubt about the Court‘s fidelity
to the basic holding of Mead, it has now evaporated. There is a Step Zero.
It requires courts to determine in the exercise of independent judgment that
the agency has been delegated authority to act with the force of law. It
requires that the agency render its interpretation of the contested provision
in the exercise of such authority.
IV. A MORE PARTICULARIZED MEAD?
City of Arlington may also point toward a more robust version of Step
Zero that limits Chevron to agency interpretations within the scope of their
delegated authority. This is because the actual disagreement between
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts—which mirrors the actual
disagreement between the positions of the government and petitioners‘
counsel Goldstein as it emerged at oral argument—is actually quite narrow.
The disagreement as it finally emerged was over the level of generality with
which the first Mead inquiry is conducted—whether Congress has
delegated authority to the agency to act with the force of law. Justice
Scalia, following the lead of the government, insisted that a grant of general
authority to an agency to act with the force of law is all that is required to
trigger Chevron.170 Chief Justice Roberts, echoing the position of
petitioners‘ counsel at oral argument, insisted that the court must ask
whether Congress delegated power to the agency to act with the force of
law with respect to the particular question presented.171 Only if the
reviewing court answers this more particularized inquiry in the affirmative
can the court apply Chevron.
If Chief Justice Roberts is right, then the Mead inquiry at Step Zero could
serve as a means of assuring that Chevron applies only to interpretations of
provisions that fall within the scope of the delegated authority of the
agency. If Congress has delegated authority to an agency to act with the
force of law with respect to the particular provision in question, then clearly
this provision is one that resides within the delegated authority of the
agency. If Justice Scalia is right, in contrast, a generic grant of rulemaking
169. 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
170. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
171. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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or adjudicatory power would confer Chevron deference on an agency with
respect to all disputes about the scope of the agency‘s authority, at least as
long as the dispute was over a provision in a statute that the agency in some
sense ―administers.‖
When one reads carefully what the Chief Justice wrote about the type of
inquiry that would be mandated under the more particularized conception of
delegated authority he advocated, the dispute becomes even narrower.
Justice Scalia argued that a single generic grant of authority to an agency to
engage in rulemaking or adjudication is enough to carry the agency into
Chevron land.172 Chief Justice Roberts in fact agreed that a general grant
would often be sufficient. But he insisted that courts should also consider
arguments to the effect that Congress has ―exempted particular provisions
from that authority,‖ in which case the general grant would not suffice to
confer Chevron review.173 Given the concession by the Chief Justice that
general grants of authority may often suffice, the dispute boils down to
whether courts, exercising independent judgment, should or should not
entertain arguments that the particular issue in question has been carved out
of a general grant of rulemaking or adjudication authority. It is hard to
credit Justice Scalia‘s charge that asking whether the particular issue before
the court is covered by an exception to a general grant of authority would
represent a ―massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence‖ or lead to
―chaos.‖174
Justice Scalia clearly won this round in what promises to be a longerterm contest over the scope of the Mead inquiry into the scope of delegated
power. It is hard for me to imagine that the Court will not end up adopting
a position closer to that of the Chief Justice than to that of Justice Scalia.
Another way to frame the issue is to ask whether the first inquiry mandated
by Mead should be undertaken by reading only part of the agency‘s organic
act or by reading all of it. What Justice Scalia was advocating, in effect,
was a superficial examination of the agency‘s organic statute, looking for
one general grant of rulemaking or adjudication authority somewhere in the
legislation. Once a court discovers such a provision, and concludes that the
agency‘s interpretation was rendered in a rule or adjudication, Chevron
kicks in and the court defers to the agency on any and all issues presented
under the statute. What Chief Justice Roberts was urging, in contrast, was
an actual examination of the agency‘s organic statute to see not only if there
is a general grant of lawmaking authority somewhere but also whether such
a grant in fact applies to the dispute before the court. How is it possible to
offer a principled justification for a superficial reading of a statute as
opposed to a careful reading of a statute?
That Justice Scalia‘s position was even plausible was made possible only
because of a quirk about the organic act in question—the Federal
Communications Act (FCA). Like other complex statutes, the FCA
includes multiple titles, which have been amended many times over the
172. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
173. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1884 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1874 (majority opinion).
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years, and several different grants of rulemaking authority. Somewhat by
chance, the Court had previously held (whether correctly or not is another
matter175) that one of the rulemaking grants in the FCA authorizes
legislative rules and extends to all portions of the Act, including
subsequently enacted provisions.176 Thus, without actually reading the
FCA, Justice Scalia was able to conclude based on precedent that there is a
rulemaking grant in the FCA that conveys omnibus authority to the agency
to act with the force of law. But consider what is likely to happen in a
future case involving an agency operating under a complex organic statute
if a party makes a credible argument that a particular rulemaking grant
applies only to one title of an act, but not to another. Will the court simply
conclude, based on the presence of one rulemaking grant, that the agency is
entitled to Chevron deference on all questions arising under the act that
implicate the scope of its authority? It seems impossible that courts should
do anything other than actually examine the full text of the statute in order
to determine whether the particular grant of authority extends to the
contested provision at issue. This is all Chief Justice Roberts was saying,
and I cannot help but believe that as other cases arise under different
statutory schemes, where there is no dispositive precedent to latch on to,
time will prove him right.
I would add one important caveat to the Chief Justice‘s reframing of the
question in terms of a search for delegated authority. The search for
exemptions to general grants of lawmaking authority cannot be limited to
statutes that expressly qualify grants of rulemaking (or adjudicatory)
authority. Most agencies have generally worded grants of rulemaking
authority, most of which were originally understood to confer power only to
make procedural and internal housekeeping rules.177 For many years,
however, the Court has construed virtually every generally worded grant of
rulemaking authority as conferring authority to make legislative rules,
without regard to the original understanding of Congress when these grants
were enacted. This assumption is now embedded in precedents that apply
to many important agencies, including the EPA, the FDA, the National
Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.178 The Court, in an
opinion by the Chief Justice, has even extended this assumption to a general
175. The rulemaking grant in question is 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). For a brief
discussion of the background of this grant, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts,
Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467,
519–20 n.264 (2002) (noting that the grant of rulemaking was added by an amendment
dealing with furnishing reports about the position of ships at sea).
176. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377–78 (1999).
177. Merrill & Watts, supra note 175, at 493–528.
178. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (EPA); Am. Hosp. Ass‘n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616 (1991) (NLRB); Household
Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004) (Federal Reserve Board). The Court
first recognized the FDA‘s legislative rulemaking authority in a group of pre-Chevron cases
known as the Hynson Quartet. See generally USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S.
655 (1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharms., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); Ciba Corp. v.
Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412
U.S. 609 (1973).
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rulemaking grant under the Internal Revenue Code that was long
understood as limited to authorizing only non-binding interpretative
rules.179
Given that general grants of rulemaking authority are now routinely
(mis)interpreted as conferring authority to act with the force of law, limiting
the search for exemptions to specific carve-outs from these grants could
create a pervasive bias in favor of expansive agency authority. In effect, the
interpretation of the general rulemaking grants would create a presumption
in favor of agency authority to act with the force of law with respect to
every function covered by these generally-worded grants. Only if Congress
had the foresight expressly to qualify the general grant of authority would
there be any limitation on the agency‘s ability to interpret its authority in
the most generous possible terms.
The solution is to assure that the search for ―exemptions‖ to Congress‘s
delegatory intent includes not just an examination of affirmative grants of
lawmaking and express exceptions to these grants but all types of
information that courts consider when attempting to ascertain legislative
intent. Gonzales v. Oregon,180 cited with approval by the Chief Justice in
his dissenting opinion, provides an apt illustration. At issue was a
regulation issued by the Attorney General interpreting the phrase
―legitimate medical purpose‖ in the Controlled Substances Act to make it a
crime to use controlled substances for the purpose of physician-assisted
suicide. The Court concluded that the Attorney General had exceeded the
scope of his delegated authority. Among the factors the Court invoked in
support of this conclusion were that the regulation criminalizing the use of
substances for the stated purpose was ―anomalous‖ given careful
restrictions on the Attorney General‘s authority to deregister a substance,181
that the statute generally delegated authority to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services over ―scientific and medical matters,‖182 and that Congress
had enacted subsequent legislation designed to preserve the authority of the
Department of Health and Human Services in determining the consensus
views of the medical community.183 As the Chief Justice noted in City of
Arlington, the Court in Gonzales considered ―the text, structure, and
purpose of the Act‖ in concluding ―on its own‖ that the Attorney General
had exceeded the scope of his delegated authority.184 This is what one
would expect of an inquiry conducted at Step One, where the court
exercises de novo review.

179. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14
(2011).
180. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
181. Id. at 262–63.
182. Id. at 265.
183. Id. at 266.
184. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted).
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V. THE FUTURE OF BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE
Going forward, there are two plausible pathways to achieving a
reconciliation between Chevron review and the traditional judicial function
of boundary maintenance. Justice Scalia, who clearly believes in the
importance of boundary maintenance, would achieve a reconciliation by
engaging periodically in aggressive review of agency action under Step One
or Step Two of Chevron. Chief Justice Roberts, who also believes in
boundary maintenance, would achieve a reconciliation by asking at Step
Zero whether Congress has in fact delegated authority to the agency to act
with the force of law with respect to the precise question in controversy.
For several reasons, I believe the Roberts pathway is the better one.
The Scalia approach portends a future in which Step One and Step Two
are applied in an accordion-like fashion. This is nothing new. Chevron
jurisprudence is already afflicted with decisions manipulating these inquires
in an ad hoc fashion. Sometimes ―clear‖ means the statute has only one
possible interpretation; sometimes it means the statute has one meaning that
is slightly preferred over all others; sometimes ―reasonable‖ means the
agency interpretation has a rational basis; sometimes it means the agency
has fully considered all relevant factors. But using the Step One and Step
Two inquiries to engage in boundary maintenance would surely exacerbate
the phenomenon.
When agencies threaten to transgress perceived
boundaries, ―clear‖ and ―reasonable‖ would become indistinguishable from
de novo review; when they stay within perceived boundaries these concepts
would revert to their more common meanings.
The Roberts approach would not be immune from judicial willfulness.
But at least it would take place as part of a candid inquiry into whether
Congress intended the agency to act with the force of law with respect to
the issue at hand. The court would be required to address boundary
maintenance explicitly, not bury it in a discussion about ―clarity‖ or
―reasonableness.‖ And the court would do so exercising independent
judgment, free from any need to pretend to be overcoming a presumption in
favor of deference to the agency.
There is also the matter of providing appropriate guidance to lower courts
and agencies. If the only thing at stake were how the Court writes its own
opinions, perhaps little would turn on whether boundary maintenance
questions were tackled at Step One, Two, or Zero. But for every case in
which the Court confronts a Chevron question, thousands are decided by
the lower courts. Those courts need appropriate guidance in how to resolve
those questions. Given the vital importance of judicial review in preserving
the proper place of agencies in American government, the threshold
question of agency authority should be highlighted for consideration by the
lower courts, not obscured.
The Scalia approach, by relegating boundary maintenance to Step One
and Step Two, masks the issue in a completely nontransparent fashion.
There will be no announced criteria alerting lower courts and agencies to
the types of circumstances that portend a shift from the deferencepromoting version of Step One and Step Two to the deference-denying
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version. It is unclear how this lack of transparency would affect lower court
behavior. On the one hand, it carries the risk that lower courts would apply
a mechanical understanding of the Chevron framework in cases involving
the scope of agency authority, and would defer to agency determinations
about their own authority whenever the text of the statute is silent or
ambiguous on the issue. On the other hand, by expanding the Step One
inquiry into a de facto form of independent judgment in cases that implicate
the scope of the agency‘s authority, the Court would risk diluting the lower
courts‘ understanding of Chevron in circumstances where the issue clearly
falls within the scope of the agency‘s domain.
The Roberts approach would run the risk, emphasized by Justice Scalia,
that courts would substitute their judgment for agencies‘ by finding that
Congress had not delegated to them the power to act with the force of law.
But at least it would render the inquiry into the scope of agency authority
far more transparent. Courts would have to consider the scope of an
agency‘s delegated authority before applying Chevron, and would be
required to find, exercising independent judgment, that such delegated
authority exists in every case. Armed with such a mandate, one would
expect lower courts, at the margins, to pay more attention to the issue and to
act with greater confidence when confronted with cases of improper agency
aggrandizement. If they find that the agency has been delegated lawmaking
authority, they would be more likely to defer to agency views under
Chevron.
Another concern involves the type of information a court can consider in
resolving questions about the boundaries of agency authority. The Court is
fond of saying that Step One of Chevron entails the use of all ordinary tools
of statutory interpretation.185 But this is misleading. Several types of
information that courts draw upon in ordinary statutory interpretation sit
awkwardly with Chevron. For instance, it is unclear how substantive (i.e.,
policy-based) canons of interpretation stand relative to Chevron. Does
Chevron override, or is it subordinate to, the canon of avoiding
constitutional questions, the canon disfavoring extraterritorial application of
U.S. law, the presumption against preemption, or the doctrine of lenity? 186
Moreover, several cases, including Chevron itself, insist that agencies
eligible for Chevron deference are free to change their mind about the
meaning of a statute, perhaps in response to changing administrative
priorities.187 This seems to rule out any consideration of historical practice
or understandings as part of Step One, even though such considerations
often carry great weight in determining the boundaries of governmental
authority.188
185. See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987); cf. City of Arlington, 133 S.
Ct. at 1868 (referring to ―ordinary tools‖ of statutory construction).
186. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 142–44 (1990).
187. E.g., Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005).
188. As Justice Frankfurter once wrote:
The consistent construction by an administrative agency charged with effectuating
the policy of an enactment carries very considerable weight. While assertion of
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Under Justice Scalia‘s approach, boundary enforcement would be
complicated by all the controversies about Chevron‘s relationship to
substantive canons of interpretation, as well as by the limitations associated
with Chevron about the relevance of longstanding agency practice. Under
the Roberts approach, courts would exercise independent judgment in
fixing boundaries, and hence would be free to consider any and all types of
information that can be drawn upon in constitutional and statutory
interpretation.
A final concern relates to the fact that boundary determination involves
far more than statutory interpretation—the sphere in which Chevron
operates. Other constraints that bear on this important function include the
complex body of law elaborating on the meaning of the Constitution,
considerations of international law as they are brought to bear through
treaties and customary law, and an understanding of the evolved roles of the
federal government and state and local governments in different areas of
legal regulation. There is every reason to believe that if and when courts
perceive that these other bodies of law bear on the issue of agency
authority, the courts will determine their relevance exercising independent
judgment.189 To this extent, the determination of boundaries will
automatically occur at the functional equivalent of Step Zero. The same is
likely to be true of agency decisions that implicate the preemption of state
law, which are given at most ―weight‖ under Skidmore, not Chevron
deference.190
Under Justice Scalia‘s approach, the sources that bear on the discernment
of government boundaries other than federal statutes must be
accommodated by a series of ad hoc exceptions to Chevron. Chevron
applies unless a constitutional law issue is presented, or unless an
international law issue is presented, or unless a question of federalism is
presented. This becomes awkward, since constitutional, international, and
federalism questions are commonly interwoven with questions of statutory
interpretation. For example, the statute may be open to interpretation in
ways that avoid constitutional questions or that permit compliance with
international law obligations. With respect to preemption, the Scalia
authority does not demonstrate its existence, long-continued, uncontested assertion
is at least evidence that the legislature conveyed the authority. Similarly, while
authority conferred does not atrophy by disuse, failure over an extended period to
exercise it is some proof that it was not given.
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 543
(1947).
189. Compare Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531
U.S. 159, 175 (2001) (declining to defer to agency interpretation of ―navigable‖ waters
because of concern that this would exceed the outer limits of federal power under the
Commerce Clause), with United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
123–26 (1985) (deferring to agency interpretation of ―navigable waters‖ under Chevron
when no constitutional question was perceived). See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.,
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (resolving an important question about the jurisdiction of the NLRB
under the canon of constitutional avoidance without any suggestion of deference to the
position of the Board).
190. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 883 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996).
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approach may lead to a mechanical disjunction between express preemption
clauses, where Chevron would apply in interpreting the statute, and implied
preemption, where it would not.191 But this is utterly unrealistic, since the
proper interpretation of express preemption statutes often requires a
determination of the permissible degree of tension between federal and state
law, which cannot be derived in any straightforward way from an
interpretation of the statute.192 Giving Chevron deference to agency views
about the express preemption clauses could result in a persistent expansion
of federal authority at the expense of the states, when courts would be more
sensitive to traditional federal-state balance.193
Under the Roberts approach, all legal sources that bear on the
identification of governmental boundaries can be seamlessly integrated at
Step Zero. Even assuming that agencies have a superior understanding of
the statutes they are specifically charged with administering, it does not
follow that they have much, if any, understanding of constitutional law,
international law, or federalism. Understanding and applying these
fundamental legal principles requires more than parsing the words of
statutes. It requires knowledge of historically derived conventions about
the appropriate functions of different legal institutions–matters that require
a more contextual analysis than simply identifying gaps and ambiguities in
a statute. There is every reason to believe that courts are the preferred
institution for understanding and integrating these sources.194
My colleague Peter Strauss, writing in this symposium, bemoans the
failure of both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts to consider whether
Skidmore is the appropriate standard to apply in determining whether an
agency is acting within the scope of its authority.195 I agree that it would be
desirable to attend to the agency‘s reasons for claiming authority over a
matter, and to ask whether these reasons are persuasive, as Skidmore would
require. Applying Skidmore to ―jurisdictional‖ questions would also
synchronize questions about the scope of agency authority with questions
about preemption, where the Court has said Skidmore, rather than either
191. Justice Scalia has ―assumed‖ that the question whether a statute impliedly preempts
state law ―must always be decided de novo by the courts.‖ Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996); see also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 38–44
(2007) (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Cuomo v. Clearing
House Ass‘n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2732 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (applying
Chevron to an express preemption clause).
192. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727,
755–59 (2008).
193. Two other contributions to this symposium debate the role of federalism in Chevron.
Seifter argues that it should play no role at Chevron Step Zero—including in the preemption
context—see Seifter, supra note 19, whereas Kent Barnett agrees that agency expertise
should be considered and, indeed, Congress has on at least one occasion stripped an agency
of Chevron deference by statute in the preemption context. Kent Barnett, Improving
Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587
(2014) (detailing how in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
12 U.S.C. § 25b(5)(A), Congress directed courts to review under the Skidmore standard any
decision to preempt state law made by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
194. Merrill, supra note 192, at 755–59.
195. Strauss, supra note 19, at 795–96.
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Chevron or de novo review, should apply. One could plausibly argue,
therefore, that Skidmore review is the first-best solution to questions about
the scope of agency authority. Skidmore cannot be applied at Step Zero,
however, because one of the questions a court seeks to resolve at Step Zero
is whether Skidmore, as opposed to Chevron or de novo review, is the
proper standard of review! Chief Justice Roberts‘s proposal to monitor
questions of agency jurisdiction as part of Step Zero, where the court
exercises de novo review, should therefore probably be regarded as a
second-best solution. Given City of Arlington, however, the only feasible
option going forward for engaging in boundary maintenance is the Step
Zero approach outlined by the Chief Justice. One would of course expect
and hope that courts will pay attention to the agency‘s reasons for asserting
authority, even if in doing so they are exercising a form of de novo review.
In sum, Justice Scalia puts Chevron first and requires a court, if it is to
engage in boundary maintenance, to squeeze its inquiry into the Chevron
framework. This means, outside the rare case where the agency has
transgressed a clear legislative limit or has adopted a manifestly
unreasonable interpretation of its organic statute, a court must distort the
inquiries at Step One and Step Two in order to preserve the structure of
governmental authority. This is unfortunate, because it lacks candor,
provides little predictability or guidance to lower courts and agencies, and
threatens to dilute the utility of Chevron as a true deference doctrine. The
Chief Justice‘s approach to reconciling Chevron and the boundary
maintenance function, in contrast, is far more transparent, allows the court
to draw upon all sources of law in determining whether Congress intended
to delegate lawmaking authority to the agency, and preserves Chevron in
full force in cases where it properly applies.
CONCLUSION
In Mead, Justice Souter characterized the root of the disagreement
between the majority and Justice Scalia as pitting those who would ―limit
and simplify‖ against those who would ―tailor deference to variety.‖196
Tailoring prevailed in Mead, but in City of Arlington, Justice Scalia
mounted a partial comeback, gaining five votes for those who would ―limit
and simplify‖ in the face of what they perceived to be a proposal for more
complexity. As Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent reveals, however, the real
dispute in City of Arlington was not one between simple and complex, but
between general and particular. Specifically, the issue was whether judges
should defer to agencies‘ interpretations of the scope of their own authority
whenever they have been given general authority to act with the force of
law, as opposed to an approach that would ask whether the agency has been
given authority to act with the force of law with respect to the precise
question in controversy. General versus particular is not the same thing as
simple versus complex. Deciding the particular issue before them is what
judges are supposed to do, without regard to whether the relevant law is
196. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2000).
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simple or complex. The Chief Justice‘s suggestion does not require a
repudiation of City of Arlington. It merely requires a refinement of Mead‘s
Step Zero—something all members of the Court now say is required before
Chevron applies. One hopes that the law will evolve in this direction, if
courts are to continue to engage effectively in the important function of
boundary maintenance in reviewing agency action.

